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The aim of this  study is to scrutinise the impact of corporate governance mechanism on 
on the performance of family and non-family controlled firms in Pakistan. It has been found 
that a corporate governance structure influences the performance of both family and non-
family controlled companies significantly. However all corporate governance mechanisms are 
not significant as the significant variables differ between family and non-family controlled 
companies. Thus, regulators need to be cautious in setting  codes for different companies. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Family firms form the basic building block of businesses throughout the world. 
The economic and social importance of family enterprises has now become more widely 
recognised. Internationally they are the dominant form of business organisation. One 
measure of their dominance is the proportion of family enterprises to registered 
companies; this is estimated to range from 75 percent in the UK to more than 95 percent 
in India, Latin America and the Far and Middle East [Yasser (2011)].  The manner in 
which family firms are governed (the way in which they are directed and controlled) is 
therefore crucial to the contribution they make to their national economies as well as to 
their owners. 
Family-owned listed companies are the backbone of Pakistan’s economy. 
However, traditionally these companies are either unaware of the general principles of 
good corporate governance, or work in a relatively less open environment. Promoting 
basic principles of good governance for family-owned companies is crucial for economic 
growth. 
Anderson and Reeb (2003) conclude from the US data that family companies 
outperform non-family companies. The same conclusions are also drawn from the studies 
of Miller and Breton-Miller (2006) and Villalonga and Amit (2006). Meanwhile, research 
in Western Europe has found that family-controlled companies have lesser agency 
problems between owner and manager but experience problems between family and 
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minority shareholders [Maury (2006)]. However, studies show that owner-manager 
companies are less efficient in generating profits than professional non-owner manager 
companies [Lauterbach and Vaninsky (1999)]. 
In sum, a host of studies on family companies have been conducted worldwide, but 
few studies concern the situation in Pakistan. This study attempts to fill this research gap. 
Most Pakistani companies are family-owned and controlled. The researchers’ aim is to 
find out whether Pakistani family-controlled companies perform better than non-family 
controlled companies or vice versa under corporate governance mechanism.  
In this study financial performance has been analysed in two perspectives: accrual 
based and cash flow based. Accrual-based profit measures are claimed to be open to 
manipulations by managers [Teoh, Wong, and Rao (1998)]. Therefore, the alternative 
performance measure based on cash flows may be preferable. Cash flow-based studies have 
been carried out by several researchers [Kaplan (1989); Jain and Kini (1994); Kim, 
Kitsabunnarat and Nofsinger (2004)] who argue that operating cash flows are a useful 
measure in determining the firm’s value and less sensitive to manipulation by managers. In 
terms of corporate governance mechanisms, this study introduces two new variables—
directors’ qualifications and independent directors with professional qualifications—that 
are expected to affect the firm’s performance. 
The presentation format of this study is as follows: 
First, the theoretical framework on family and non-family companies’ 
performance and corporate governance mechanism is discussed in the literature review 
section. The research methodology is then explained followed by the research findings 
and discussion. Finally, the research findings are summarised giving the study’s 
limitations and recommendations are made for future studies. 
 
2.  THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND  
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
This section develops the hypotheses regarding the effects on performance of 
family-controlled and non-family controlled companies under corporate governance 
mechanisms. 
 
2.1.  Family and Non-family Companies’ Performance 
A study conducted by Daily and Dollinger (1992) shows that family companies 
reported higher sales growth and greater improvement in net margins than non-family 
companies. McConaughy, Walker, Henderson, and Mishra (1998) examine differences in 
efficiency and value, depending on whether the firm was founding family-controlled firm 
(FFCF) and had a CEO who was the founder/a descendant of the founder, or was a non-
FFCF. The findings show that FFCFs are more efficient and valuable than NFFCFs in 
respect of industry, size and managerial ownership.  
McConaughy, Matthews, and Fialko (2001) found that family companies have 
higher Tobin’s Q than their counterparts. The family companies controlled by the 
founding family have greater value, operate more efficiently and carry less debt than 
other companies. Miller and Breton-Miller (2006) note that family companies perform 
better than non-family companies when the family companies have the intention to pass 
on the businesses to their progenies. A study by Maury (2006) in 13 Western European 
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countries found that active family control continued to outperform non-family controlled 
firms in terms of profitability in different legal regimes. In 2008, a survey conducted by 
Pakistan Institute of Corporate Governance (PICG) indicated that 80 percent of firms 
cannot reach the third generation of their founders in Pakistan. 
Family companies have several incentives to reduce agency costs [Fama and 
Jensen (1983); Demsetz and Lehn (1985); Anderson and Reeb (2003)]. As a family’s 
wealth is closely linked to the firm’s welfare, there is a strong incentive to monitor 
managers and minimise the free-rider problem inherent in small, atomistic shareholders 
[Demsetz and Lehn (1985)]. Research also claims that executives who are stewards are 
motivated to act in the best interests of their principals [Donaldson and Davis (1991)]. 
Stewardship philosophy has been practised and is common among successful family 
companies [Corbetta and Salvato (2004)]. Keen involvement encouraged by stewardship 
philosophy creates a sense of psychological ownership that motivates the family to 
behave in the best interest of the firm [Zahra (2005); Corbetta and Salvato (2004)].  
However, it is difficult for family companies to avoid the misalignment between 
principal and agents. The agency cost in family companies can take place between 
minority owners and the major family owners who serve as their potentially exploitative 
de facto agents [Morck and Yeung (2003); Villalonga and Amit (2006)]. Amran and 
Ahmad (2009) found that there is no difference in performance between family-
controlled businesses and non-family controlled businesses for companies listed from 
2000 to 2003. Firm performance diminishes as large shareholders remain active in 
management although they are no longer competent or qualified to run the firm. The 
implication is that firm performance is even worse for older family companies than for 
non-family companies [Shleifer and Vishny (1997)]. Hence, based on the arguments, the 
researcher hypothesised that: 
H1: Family companies have higher financial performance than non-family 
companies. 
 
2.2. Board Composition  
Non-executive directors are needed on boards to monitor and control the actions of 
executive directors due to their opportunistic behaviour and act as checks and balances in 
enhancing the boards’ effectiveness [Jensen and Meckling (1976)]. Additionally, non-
executive directors might be considered to be “decision experts” [Fama and Jensen 
(1983)], independent and not intimidated by the CEO [Weisbach (1988)], able to reduce 
managerial consumption of perquisites [Brickley and James (1987)] and act as a positive 
influence over the directors’ deliberations and decisions [Pearce and Zahra (1992)]. 
According to Tricker (1984) the presence of non-executive directors on boards provides 
“additional windows on the world”. This is congruent with the resource dependence 
theory, which proposes that non-executive directors act as middlemen between 
companies and the external environment due to their expertise, prestige and contacts.  
According to Pakistani Code of Corporate Governance (2002), boards of directors 
to be balanced should not have more than 75 percent executive directors. Empirical 
studies [Ward and Handy (1988); Ward (1991); Felton and Watson (2002); Newell and 
Wilson (2002)] show that family companies prefer to have independent non-executive 
directors in their boards. Independent directors provide neutral insights, bring in fresh, 
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creative perspectives and help in decision-making by bringing in new dimensions of 
experiences that may not be found among family directors. In family companies, the 
representatives of non-family directors on the board can offer a functional counterpoint in 
decision-making. Ward and Handy (1988) report that 88 percent of companies using non-
executive directors believe that their boards are more useful and valuable as corporate 
governance agents of performance. 
In contrast, a high proportion of non-executive directors on boards, as proposed by 
agency and resource dependency theories, also have drawbacks. Arguments against 
boards dominated by non-executive directors include stifling strategic actions [Goodstein, 
Gautam, and Boeker (1994)], excessive monitoring [Baysinger and Butler (1985)] and 
lack of real independence [Demb and Neubauer (1992)].  However, research by Klein, 
Shapiro and Young (2005) found no evidence that board composition affects firm 
performance. In family-owned companies, a high level of board independence does not 
automatically lead to better performance. Chin, Vos, and Casey (2004) also claim that the 
percentage of non-executive directors has little impact on overall firm performance. It 
means that the composition of independent non-executives directors seem has a mixed 
impact on performance. Therefore, the authors hypothesised that:  
H2: There is a significant association between proportion of independent non-
executive directors and financial performance. 
 
2.3. Director’s Qualification 
The Code of Corporate Governance (2002) recommends that directors should use 
their qualities (skills, knowledge and experience, professionalism and integrity) in 
carrying out their duties. This is consistent with the resource dependence theory. Castillo 
and Wakefield (2006) show that educational background and skills may influence family 
companies’ performance. A family’s special technical knowledge concerning a firm’s 
operations may put it in a better position to monitor the firm more effectively. Also, 
families have incentive to counteract the free rider problem that prevents atomised 
shareholders from bearing the costs of monitoring, ultimately reducing agency costs. 
Sebora and Wakefield (1998) find a positive relationship between education of the 
incumbent and conflict over money, management control and strategic vision. Educated 
incumbents may have been exposed to better financial management than their less 
educated counterparts. Based on the arguments, the authors hypothesised that: 
H3: There is a relationship between proportion of directors’ qualification and 
financial performance. 
 
2.4. Independent Director’s with Professional Qualification 
Independent directors’ background and competence are essential factors as they 
contribute positively to the family-owned companies [Johannisson and Huse (2000)]. 
However, Hartvigsen (2007) claims that companies are facing challenge in searching for 
qualified directors to sit on the boards. Most of the families prefer interlock directorship to 
secure their point of view in business operations. A survey conducted in the US by Ernst and 
Young reports that many companies in Europe and America complain that they struggle to 
find qualified directors for their boards [The Economist (2006)]. Hendry (2002) also 
highlights that family companies face problems of having competent and expert agents.  
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Moreover, Berube (2005) notes that companies cannot contend with directors who 
simply put in a token appearance. Companies seek qualified directors, together with their 
expertise. A report from Christian and Timbers in New York also reflects the tough 
competition for qualified outside directors [Bates (2003)]. Therefore, the authors 
hypothesised that:  
H4: There is a relationship between the proportion of independent directors with 
professional qualification and financial performance. 
 
2.5. Board Meetings 
The corporate governance view is that the board should meet regularly to discuss 
matters that arise. There are various suggestions for the frequency of board meetings. In 
the US, six meetings per year in alternate months is thought to be a good balance for most 
companies, when supplemented by occasional special meetings [Moore (2002)]. Boards 
meet formally at least four times per year, supplemented by additional monthly executive 
committee meetings attended by directors, the chairman, the CEO and senior managers 
[Ward (1991)].  
Pakistani Code of Corporate Governance (2002) proposes that the board should 
meet regularly, with due notice of issues to be discussed but should meet at least once in 
a quarter. 
The board should disclose the number of board meetings held in a year and the 
details of attendance of each individual director; it should also maintain minutes of 
meetings. Based on the above literatures, the authors hypothesised that:  
H5: There is a relationship between the number of meetings and financial 
performance. 
 
2.6. Leadership Structure  
The corporate governance perspective views the CEO duality to arise when the post 
of the CEO and Chairman are managed by one and the same person. The agency theory 
claims that there must be a separation between ownership and control. The separate 
leadership structure can curb agency problems, and enhance the firm’s value [Fama and 
Jensen (1983)]. 
In contrast, duality leadership is common among family companies [Chen, 
Cheung, Stouraitis and Wong  (2005)]. The founder-CEOs as more concerned about the 
survival of their companies and are willing to protect their legacy for future generations. 
In the US, Moore (2002) finds that some companies have the CEO as the board chairman 
in order to focus the company’s’ leadership. In addition, by splitting the role of the 
chairman and CEO, it reduces the CEO’s freedom of action [Felton and Watson (2002)]. 
Other researchers find that stewards who hold the position of a board executive and a 
chairman concurrently have significantly higher corporate performance [Donaldson and 
Davis (1991); Finkelstein and D’Aveni (1994)].  
Still others suggest there is no significant difference in firm performance between 
executive and non-executive chairmen [Chaganti, Mahajan and Sharma (1985); Molz 
(1988)].  The CEO-chair is responsible for the firm and the CEO has the power to 
determine strategy without fear of counter demands by an outside chair of the board 
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[Finkelstein and D’Aveni (1994); Davis, et al. (1991)]. Based on these mixed findings, 
the authors hypothesised that:  
H6: There is a significant association between financial performance and the 
practice of  separate leadership. 
 
2.7. Control Variables  
The control variables in this study are debt, firm age and firm size. Companies do 
appear to make their choice of financing instrument as though they had target levels in 
mind for both the long-term debt ratio, and the ratio of short-term total debt [Marsh 
(1982)]. A study by Welch (2003) finds that there is a negative correlation between a 
firm’s debt levels and corporate performance. 
Ongore (2011) argues that all companies around the globe choose internal over 
external finance and debt over equity. Companies do not aim at any target debt ratio; 
instead, the debt ratio is just the cumulative result of hierarchical financing over time. 
Companies that face a financial deficit will first resort to debt, and will be observed later 
at a higher debt ratio [Myers and Majluf (1984)].  
Next, the firm age is an important determinant of firm growth, the variability of firm 
growth and the probability of firm dissolution [Evans (1987)]. A study relating to firm age 
conducted by Dunne and Hughes (1994) finds that smaller companies were growing faster 
than the larger ones, though with more variable growth rate patterns. The smaller companies 
also shared a relatively low death rate from takeover as compared to the large companies, 
while medium sized companies were most vulnerable to takeover. The findings also revealed 
that younger companies, for a given size, grew faster than older companies.  
Firm size can be “retarded” if a family management team is reluctant to raise 
external funds because it fears it will entail a loss of family control [Yasser (2011)]. Daily 
and Dollinger (1992) argue that some family companies operate without growth plans. As 
a result, some family companies only grow at a pace consistent with meeting the 
advancement needs of organisational members in the family system. Cromie, Stephenson, 
and Montieth (1995) found that family companies were smaller in terms of employment 
and sales turnover than non-family companies. Trow (1961) argues that larger companies 
have more resources, making it easy to attract, train, and develop potential successors and 
to engage outside advisers who may encourage continuity planning [Yasser (2011)].  
 
3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1. Data 
The researcher gathered data from a sample of Pakistani companies listed on the 
Karachi Stock Exchange over the period of 2003 to 2008. This period was selected 
because this study seeks to examine the post effect of the implementation of the Code of 
Corporate Governance issued in 2002. A total of 134 companies have been selected for 
the study so the sample size for six years’ observations was 804. This study adopted 
panel regression model analysis to determine the coefficient correlation between 
independent and dependent variables [Gorriz and Fumas (2005); Anderson and Reeb 
(2003)]. 
The definition of family-controlled firm was consistent with previous studies [Anderson 
and Reeb (2003); Villalonga and Amit (2006)]. In determining the family companies, the 
information on directors’ profile and shareholdings were collected from the annual reports and 
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corporate websites of companies. Data on board composition, directors’ education, independent 
directors with professional qualification, number of meetings and leadership structure were also 
obtained from the annual reports. Financial data such as market value of ordinary shares, total 
assets, net income, earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA), 
shareholder’s equity, return on assets (ROA), long term debt and operating cash flow were 
gathered from independent financial analysts. Then, the financial data was cross-checked with 
the printed annual reports to make the information more reliable. 
 
3.2. Research Model and Measurement  
In this study, the research model is as follows:  
Model for total sample:  
FPERFit = b0 + b1 FCPit + b2 BCOMPOit + b3 DIRQUALit + b4 PROQUALit + 
B5 MEETGit + b6 LSHIPit + b7 DEBTit + b8 FAGEit + b9 FSIZEit + i + t + it  (1) 
Model for family-controlled companies and non-family controlled companies: 
FPERFit = b0 + b1 FCPit + b2 BCOMPOit + b3 PROQUALit + b4 MEETGit +  
B5 LSHIPit + b7 DEBTit + b8 FAGEit + b9 FSIZEit + i + t + it  … (2) 
 
3.3.  Model Specification  
Variables, definitions and measurements are given in Table 1 mentioned below. 
 
Table 1 
Variables, Definitions and Measurements 
Variable Measurement 
Dependent Variables 
Tobin’s Q (Q)  Market value of common equity plus book value of preferred shares 
and debt divided by book value of total assets. 
Return on assets (ROA) Net income divided by book value of total assets. 
Operating cash flow (OCF) Ratio of cash flow from operating activities to total assets. 
Independent Variables 
Family-controlled firm (FCF) Family-controlled firm is defined as: (1) Founder is the CEO or successor is 
related by blood or marriage, (2) At least two family members in the 
management, and (3) Family directors have managerial ownership (direct 
and indirect shareholdings) of minimum 20 percent in the firm. It is coded as 
1 if it is a family-controlled firm, 0 for non-family controlled firm. 
Board composition (BCOMPO) % of independent non-executive director/ total directors. 
Director’s qualification (DIRQUAL) % of directors’ with degree/ total directors. 
Professional qualification 
(PROQUAL) 
% of independent director with professional qualification/ total directors. 
Professional is defined as an individual that hold the professional title (CA, 
CMA, CPA, and ACCA), engineering, information technology, law and others. 
Meeting (MEETG) The frequency of meetings per year. 
Leadership structure (LSHIP) Firm practice whether separate or duality leadership. It is coded as 1, if firm 
practice separate leadership, 0 for duality separate or duality leadership. 
Control Variables 
DEBT The book value of long-term debt/ total assets. 
Firm Age (FAGE) The number of years since incorporated. 
Firm Size (FSIZE) The natural log of the book value of total assets. 
Source: Developed for this research. 
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3.4.  Panel Data Approach 
In order to test the proposed model equations, this paper employs panel data 
approach because it facilitates elimination of the unobservable heterogeneity that the 
different companies in the sample data could present [Himmelberg, et al. (1999)]. Yasser 
(2011) describe that a panel data regression has some advantages over regression that run 
cross sectional or time series regression independently. First, combining time series and 
cross sectional observation panel data gives more informative data, variability, less co-
linearity among the variables, more degree of freedoms, and more efficiency. Secondly, 
by making data available for several thousand units, a panel data can minimise the bias 
that might result if individual or firm level data are divided into broad aggregates. Last, 
panel data can better detect and measure effects that simply cannot be observed in pure 
cross-section or pure time series data [Gujarati (2003); Baltagi (2001)].  
The classical normal linear regression assumes that the error term is constant over 
time periods and locations. If such assumption is true than it is said that homoskedasticity 
exists. However, if there are variations in the observation, it may cause the variance of 
the error term produced from the regression not to be constant and as a result, the 
problem of heteroskedasticity prevails. If that occurs, the estimates of the dependent 
variable become less predictable [Gujarati (2003)]. 
 
4.  RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 
4.1.  Descriptive Analysis  
Table 2 summarises the statistics on all companies, family-controlled companies 
and non-family controlled companies with relation to the sector. Overall, the highest 
sector in this sample was properties (27.4 percent), followed by industrial products (26.71 
percent), trading services (15.75 percent), consumer products and plantations (10.96 
percent). Then, the sample was split into family-controlled and non-family controlled 
companies. For family-controlled companies, the first place is industrial products (27.38 
percent), followed by properties (26.19 percent), and trading services (16.67 percent). 
Meanwhile, for non-family controlled companies, properties sector (29.03 percent) was 
in the top rank, followed by industrial products (25.81 percent).  
 
Table 2 
Descriptive Analysis 
Sectors All Companies % FCF % NFCF % 
Personal Goods 198 21.21% 132 26.51% 66 21.57% 
Industrial Product 102 12.88% 66 13.25% 36 11.76% 
Insurance 60 4.55% 24 4.82% 36 11.76% 
Household Goods 48 5.30% 24 4.82% 24 7.84% 
Construction and Material 42 3.79% 24 4.82% 18 5.88% 
Food Producer 180 34.85% 144 28.92% 36 11.76% 
Chemical 66 6.82% 42 8.43% 24 7.84% 
Financial Services 72 6.82% 18 3.61% 54 17.65% 
Automobile and Parts 36 3.79% 24 4.82% 12 3.92% 
Total 804 100% 498 100% 306 100% 
Source: Developed for this research. 
Notes: FCF = Family-controlled companies, NFCF = Non-family controlled companies. 
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4.2. Univariate Tests 
In Table 3, t-test results show that there was a difference in performance (as 
measured by TOBINS Q) between family and non-family controlled companies. Family-
controlled companies have shown higher mean value (0.828) as compared to non-family 
controlled companies (0.674). It implies that family-controlled companies have better 
firm performance. These findings are in line with previous studies [Daily and Dollinger 
(1992); McConaughy, et al. (1998); Anderson and Reeb (2003); Miller and Breton-Miller 
(2006); Martinez, Stohr, and Quiroga (2007)] which indicate that family-controlled 
companies are likely to achieve higher performance than non-family controlled 
companies. Family companies have greater firm value, operate more efficiently and 
families have the intention to keep the business for their next generations. In contrast, 
when OCF is used as dependent variable, it is evident that non-family controlled 
companies have a higher mean of OCF (0.062) compared to family-controlled companies 
(0.038). It shows that non-family controlled companies are better at managing the 
companies’ cash flows. 
 
Table 3 
Means, Standard Deviation and Tests of Differences in Means between  
Family and Non-family Controlled Companies and Corporate  
Governance Mechanisms with Performance Indicators 
 All Companies FCF NFCF 
Dif. In Mean t-value  Mean S.D Mean S.D Mean S.D 
Tobin Q 0.773 0.132 0.828 0.116 0.674 0.138 0.026 4.306* 
ROA 0.042 0.079 0.049 0.057 0.041 0.101 0.002 0.258 
OCF 0.048 0.136 0.038 0.070 0.062 0.192 –0.025 –2.41* 
BCOMPO 0.396 0.115 0.372 0.090 0.429 0.136 –0.056 –6.755* 
DIRQUAL 0.770 0.198 0.725 0.199 0.839 0.174 –0.119 –8.397 
PROQUAL 0.168 0.131 0.157 0.119 0.183 0.146 –0.026 –2.649* 
MEETG 5.305 1.999 4.967 1.212 5.765 2.658 0.798 5.434 
DEBT 0.121 0.137 0.125 0.136 0.117 0.146 0.008 0.796** 
FAGE 11.830 13.910 10.971 12.264 12.994 15.817 –2.022 –1.945 
FSIZE 13.599 0.801 13.655 0.812 13.524 0.780 0.131 2.184 
LSHIP 0.898 0.295 0.850 0.358 0.970 0.174 –0.120 –7.683*** 
Source: Developed for this research. 
Notes: *Significant at 0.05 (1 tailed); ** significant at 0.01 (1 tailed); Tobin Q=Market value of common equity 
plus book value of preferred shares and debt divided by book value of total assets, ROA=Net income 
divided by book value of total assets, OCF=Ratio of cash flow from operating activities to total assets, 
LSHIP=Type of leadership that a firm practice, whether separate leadership or duality leadership, 
BCOMPO = Percentage of independent non-executive director divided by total directors, DIRQUAL = 
Percentage of directors’ with degree and above divided by total directors, PROQUAL = Percentage of 
independent director with professional qualification divided by total directors, MEETG = The 
frequency a firm conducts meetings per year, DEBT = The book value of long-term debt by total assets, 
FAGE = Number of years since incorporated, FSIZE = Natural log of the book value of total assets; # 
For LSHIP, a chi-square test was applied. 
 
In terms of PROQUAL, the mean for non-family controlled companies (0.183) is 
higher than that of family-controlled companies (0.157). The results show that non-family 
controlled companies prefer to have more independent professional directors on their boards 
as compared to family-controlled companies. The independent directors, it is  claimed bring in 
fresh creative perspectives, are more objective, have new dimensions of experience, are more 
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open in discussions and enhance management accountability [Ward and Handy (1988)]. On 
the other hand, owners of family-controlled companies were reluctant to appoint independent 
directors because they were afraid of losing control, did not believe that the non-executive 
directors understood the firm’s competitive situation, were afraid of opening up to new, 
external ideas and their boards spent a lot of time on more urgent, operational issues [Ward 
(1991)]. Executives provide rich firm-specific knowledge and strong commitment to the firm 
[Sundaramurthy and Lewis  (2003)].  The LSHIP variable is significant, whereby there are 
differences between leadership structure practised by family and non-family controlled 
companies. For DEBT, family-controlled companies favour the use of debt more than non-
family controlled companies. The mean value of debt for family-controlled companies was 
0.125, while that for non-family controlled companies was 0.117.  
The use of debt is preferred by family-controlled companies because they prefer 
internal to external fund. This finding supports Myers and Majluf’s study (1984). On the 
other hand, non-family controlled companies prefer to have lower usage of debt and use 
other sources of financing to run their business operation. This finding supports Welch’s 
study (2003). However, the results discussed above only give directions for the 
hypotheses. The next section discusses the multivariate analysis which is more robust.  
 
4.3. Multivariate Tests  
 
4.3.1. Pooled OLS  
On the bases of the results reported in Table 4, when data is pooled together (for 
all companies), results reveal that family-controlled firm (H1) and board composition 
(H2) hypotheses are supported using Q, ROA and OCF.  
 
Table 4 
The Pooled Ordinary Least Square by Using Q, ROA and OCF (All Companies) 
 Tobin Q ROA OCF 
 Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
FCF 0.034 3.54*** 0.018 3.07*** –0.016 –2.57 
BCOMPO –0.089 –2.15 –0.08 –3.32 –0.062 –2.34 
DIRQUAL 0.041 1.71*** 0.017 1.25 –0.009 –0.57 
PROQUAL 0.098 2.72*** 0.021 0.99 0.034 1.51 
MEETG 0.001 0.38 –0.004 –2.99 –0.001 –1.06 
LSHIP –0.022 –1.45 0.008 0.84 0.001 0.15 
DEBT 0.046 1.65** –0.051 –3.13 –0.053 –3.02 
FAGE 0.00 0.85 0.00 –2.21 –0.001 –3.82 
FSIZE –0.024 –5.78 0.016 6.79*** 0.009 3.6*** 
F-statistic 7.44 11.74 5.37 
R2 0.04 0.07 0.03 
Source: Developed for this Research. 
Notes: *Significant at 0.1 (1 tailed); **significant at 0.05 (1 tailed); *** significant at 0.01 (1 tailed); Q = 
Market value of common equity plus book value of preferred shares and debt divided by book value of 
total assets, ROA = Net income divided by book value of total assets, OCF = Ratio of cash flow from 
operating activities to total assets, FCF = Family-controlled firm, LSHIP = Type of leadership that a 
firm practice, whether separate leadership or duality leadership, BCOMPO = Percentage of 
independent non-executive director divided by total directors, DIRQUAL = Percentage of directors’ 
with degree and above divided by total Directors, PROQUAL = Percentage of independent director 
with professional qualification divided by total directors, MEETG = The frequency a firm conducts 
meetings per year, DEBT = The book value of long-term debt by total assets, FAGE = Number of 
years since incorporated, FSIZE = Natural log of the book value of total assets. 
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The director’s qualification (H3) and independent directors with professional 
qualification (H4) are only supported when Q is used as indicator to measure firm 
performance. Meeting (H5) and leadership structure (H6) are supported only when ROA 
is applied. 
The findings reveal that family-controlled companies have higher firm 
performance as compared to non-family controlled companies. Thus, H1 is accepted. 
This is in line with previous studies [McConaughy, et al. (2001); Anderson and Reeb 
(2003); Maury (2006); Matinez, Stohr, and Quiroga (2007)]. In terms of board 
composition, the results indicate that higher proportion of independent directors leads to 
lower firm value. These results may explain that independent directors that dominated the 
board may act as  “additional windows” [Trickers (1984)] and lack of real independence 
[Demb and Neubauer (1992)]. So, this study does not support H2. 
When Q is used as a performance indicator, the results show that DIRQUAL and 
PROQUAL are significant. Thus, H3 and H4 are accepted. The results indicate a positive 
direction whereby directors with qualifications may enhance firm performance. 
Moreover, when the board consists of higher numbers of independent directors with 
professional qualifications, the firm’s value increases. This is because the educational 
background, competence and skills are used to manage the companies. Thus, these 
findings support previous studies [Johannisson and Huse (2000); Castillo and Wakefield 
(2006)]. 
However, when ROA is used as the performance indicator, it is found that 
MEETG is negatively related with firm performance. It explains that greater frequency of 
meetings is not an effective factor, it can deteriorate the firm value. 
So, H5 is not supported. DEBT and FAGE are negatively related with firm 
performance. Debt findings and firm age results are in line with studies by Dunne and 
Hughes (1994). This research found FSIZE to be positively related to firm performance. 
This is consistent with a previous study by Trow (1961). 
 
4.3.2.  Panel Data Regression 
Besides using the Pooled Ordinary Least Square (OLS), a Hausman test was 
carried out to determine whether the Fixed Effect Model (FE) or Random Effect Model 
(RE) is appropriate in this study. The result of the Hausman test shows that the p value 
was significant, so the F-statistic result, FE is more applicable in this study.  
Table 5 explains that board composition for family and non-family controlled 
companies is negatively related with firm performance. It explains that when more 
independent directors sit on the board, the firm’s performance decreases. Thus, 
companies do not fully utilise the roles of the independent directors. The directors may sit 
on the board to fulfill the board composition requirements or to show that the board is 
“independent”, but in reality it is not. These findings do support previous studies 
[Trickers (1984); Demb and Neubauer (1992)]. 
In terms of the director’s qualifications, only non-family controlled companies show 
positive relations with performance. Higher qualifications of directors help companies to 
achieve higher firm performance. The directors’ educational background, competence and 
skills are used to manage the companies. This finding supports previous studies [Castillo 
and  Wakefield  (2006)]. For  variable  PROQUAL,  family  and  non-family  controlled  
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Table 5 
Tobin Q, ROA and OCF (Family and Non-family Controlled Companies) 
 Tobin Q ROA OCF 
 FCF NFCF FCF NFCF FCF NFCF 
 Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
FCF 0.000 –0.0073 0.0002 0.000 0.0000 0.0007 
BCOMPO –0.024 0.103*** –0.021 –0.105*** –0.009 –0.091 
DIRQUAL –0.008 0.116*** –0.004 0.053** –0.011 –0.029 
PROQUAL 0.314*** –0.106*** 0.050*** 0.004 –0.012 0.088** 
MEETG 0.011** –0.000 0.000 –0.006*** 0.001 –0.003 
LSHIP –0.017 –0.064 0.002 0.045 0.003 0.007 
DEBT 0.021 0.103*** –0.009 –0.130*** –0.021 –0.121 
FAGE 0.000 0.000 –0.000*** –0.000 0.000* 0.001 
FSIZE –0.022* –0.028 0.000 0.029*** 0.002 0.017 
F-statistic 21.00 12.21 8.24 2.42 10.65 3.92 
Source: Developed for this research. 
Notes: *Significant at 0.1 (1 tailed); **significant at 0.05 (1 tailed); *** significant at 0.01 (1 tailed); FCF = 
Family-controlled companies, NFCF = Non-family controlled firm, Tobin Q = Market value of 
common equity plus book value of preferred shares and debt divided by book value of total assets, 
ROA = Net income divided by book value of total assets, OCF = Ratio of cash flow from operating 
activities to total assets, LSHIP = Type of leadership that a firm practice, whether separate leadership 
or duality leadership, BCOMPO = Percentage of independent non-executive director divided by total 
directors, DIRQUAL = Percentage of directors’ with degree and above divided by total Directors, 
PROQUAL = Percentage of independent director with professional qualification divided by total 
directors, MEETG = The frequency a firm conducts meetings per year, DEBT = The book value of 
long-term debt by total assets, FAGE = Number of years since incorporated, FSIZE = Natural log of 
the book value of total assets.  
 
companies show a negative relationship with the firm performance. The results indicate that 
having a higher number of independent directors with professional qualifications, does not 
improve a firm’s performance. This explains that family and non-family controlled 
companies may have problems getting competent directors on their boards [Henry (2002)]. 
Family-controlled companies favour more meetings to enhance firm performance. 
This may be due to the fact that the more regularly they meet; the more they discuss 
matters without being constrained by time. Decision-making is taken seriously because 
the companies seek to have their assets transferred to future generations. In contrast, for 
non-family controlled companies, several meetings are ineffective. Non-family controlled 
companies usually comprise more outsiders. So, these outsiders work professionally such 
that when conducting meetings, every matter is taken seriously and time is used wisely. 
The LSHIP variable for non-family companies is negatively related with firm 
performance. It shows that separate leadership actually enhances firm performance. In 
terms of control variables (debt, firm age and firm size) the results show a negative 
relationship with firm performance. Non-family controlled companies do not favour the use 
of debt which is consistent with previous studies by Welch (2003). Family and non-family 
controlled companies support the notion that a firm’s value decreases as it ages, and this is 
in line with studies by Dunne and Hughes (1994). The finding supports research by Daily 
and Dollinger (1992). The research found that being non-family controlled enhances firm 
performance (when ROA and OCF are used as firm performance indicators). Thus, this 
finding also supports previous studies by Trow (1961).  
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5.  CONCLUSION 
Overall, this study finds that there are significant differences between family and 
non-family controlled firms’ performance when measured by Tobin Q, ROA and OCF. 
For family-controlled companies, only two variables (PROQUAL and MEETG) are 
significant. Boards that have higher composition of professional directors show higher 
firm performance. But board meetings’ frequency constitutes a variant trend. Family-
controlled companies do show lower number of meetings. For non-family controlled 
companies, the board governance variables (BCOMPO, DIRQUAL, PROQUAL, 
MEETG and LSHIP) as suggested by Pakistan’s Code of Corporate Governance (2002) 
have improved the firm performance. In addition, debt, firm size and firm age affect a 
firm’s performance. It shows that corporate governance does play a vital role in 
influencing Pakistani companies’ financial performance. Family-controlled companies do 
not comply with the guidelines provided by the Securities and Exchange Commission of 
Pakistan (2002). Thus, regulators need to take note that family and non-family controlled 
companies apply different sets of practices in managing their companies. 
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